Abstract. Poole (QJE, 1970) using a IS-LM model presented the …rst formal treatment of the classic question: how should a monetary authority decide whether to use the money stock or the interest rate as the policy instrument. We update the seminal work of Poole in a microfounded ‡exible-price general equilibrium model of money using explicit welfare criteria. Speci…cally, we study the optimal choice of monetary policy instruments in a overlapping-generations economy where limited communication and stochastic relocation creates an endogenous transactions role for …at money. The economy is hit with real endowment shocks and liquidity shocks. Overall, our results suggest that the central insight of Poole survives: when the shocks are real (nominal), welfare is higher under money growth (in ‡ation rate) targeting. Expansionary policies may be optimal. Deviations from optimal policies create fairly large welfare losses.
Introduction
The optimal conduct of monetary policy, whether to target the money growth rate or the in ‡ation rate, has survived as one of the most contentious issues in monetary economics. Popular until recently, Milton Friedman's (1960) "mechanical monetarism"advised central banks to stop setting interest rates and instead set the money growth rate permanently at the estimated growth rate of the real economy. Since the 80s, however, the dominant paradigm in the practice of monetary policy shifted, bringing with it a renewed "dedication to price stability" via the direct control of in ‡ation via interest rate targeting. 1 Poole (1970) presented the …rst formal treatment of the larger question: how should a monetary authority decide whether to use the money stock or the interest rate as the policy instrument. The debate at the time, as summarized by Poole, took the following shape: while some argued that "monetary policy should set the money stock while letting the interest rate ‡uctuate as it will", others believed that monetary authorities should Date: March 14, 2005. Very preliminary version prepared solely for various conferences; please do not quote. 1 The paradigm shift had a lot to do with central bankers'perceptions that in ‡ation targeting was "...a way to prevent the wild swings in monetary policy that were responsible for, or at least complicit in, many of the macroeconomic mistakes of the past. A central bank committed to in ‡ation targeting would likely have avoided both the big de ‡ation during the Great Depression of the 1930s and the accelerating in ‡ation of the 1970s (and thus the deep disin ‡ationary recession that followed)." Mankiw and Reis (2003) "push interest rates up in times of boom, and down in times of recession, while the money supply is allowed to ‡uctuate as it will." 2 Using a stochastic IS-LM model, with reduction in variability of aggregate output as the yardstick, Poole reached the conclusion that if "disturbances originated primarily in the IS function that summarized the real sectors of the economy [...] , the money stock is the proper control instrument. But if the LM function, representing the monetary sector, is the source of the disturbances, the interest rate is the proper control variable" (Poole and Lieberman, 1972) . The bottom line advice was clear and extremely in ‡uential: when the shocks are real in nature, …x the money supply; if the shocks are monetary, …x the interest rate. This paper takes up Poole's "instrument problem"within the context of a modern "optimal policy-making framework" as described by Stern and Miller (2004) . 3 The setting is a two-period lived pure-exchange overlapping generations model in the tradition of Townsend (1987) and Champ, Smith, and Williamson (1997) where limited communication and stochastic relocation create an endogenous transactions role for …at money. More speci…cally, at the end of each period some fraction of agents is relocated (the "movers") to a location di¤erent from the one they were born in and the only asset they can use to "communicate" with their past is …at money. This allows money to be dominated in rate of return. The other asset is a linear storage technology with a …xed real return. The "stochastic relocations"act like shocks to agents'portfolio preferences and, in particular, trigger liquidations of some assets at potential losses. They have the same consequences as "liquidity preference shocks"in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) , and motivate a role for banks that take deposits, hold cash reserves, and make other less liquid investments. Depending on agents' risk aversion, the banks'cash reserves are sensitive/insensitive to the real return on money.
We study two variants of this model, one in which there are real shocks (the youngage good endowment of the agents is stochastic), and one where the fraction of agents relocating is itself random (liquidity preference or monetary shocks). In either case, banks can promise a real return to only the non-movers. For the movers, the banks can promise an amount of money (paid out of the bank's reserve holdings) but not the real return on it. To see this, consider the case of endowment shocks. Here, the bank this period cares about next period's endowment because the latter will potentially in ‡uence that period's money demand, hence the price level and thus the return on money between this period and the next. But next period's money demand depends on the following period's endowment, and so on. We assume that all agents know the distributions of the real or monetary shocks and form expectations about the return on money conditional on these distributions, and in a rational expectations equilibrium, these expectations are correct. We focus solely on stationary equilibria.
Our goal is identical to that of Poole (1970) : can we use the model to tell us if in ‡ation targeting is superior in a stationary welfare sense to money growth targeting, and when? As a benchmark, we start by studying the deterministic case. Here, as noted by Poole, "it obviously makes no di¤erence whatsoever whether the policy prescription is in terms of setting the interest rate or in terms of setting the money stock...". The best policy, as discussed in Bhattacharya, Haslag, and Russell (2005) is to hold the money stock …xed (zero in ‡ation). When shocks are added to the environment, we …nd that Poole's results are validated by our analysis. When the economy is hit with i.i.d shocks to the endowment, we can show, for a general class of CRRA utility functions, that an optimally chosen …xed money growth rate is stationary welfare superior to an optimally chosen …xed in ‡ation rate. Indeed, the percentage gain in stationary welfare in switching from in ‡ation targeting to monetary targeting can be quite high.
The situation is exactly reversed when the shocks are monetary in nature, that is they a¤ect the fraction of agents relocating; here in ‡ation targeting does a better job than monetary targeting. We …nd that the optimal net in ‡ation rate maybe positive or negative. Interestingly, under in ‡ation rate targeting it may be optimal to pursue an expansionary policy, it is never optimal to do so under money growth targeting. Numerical exercises also reveal that the percentage gain in stationary welfare in switching from monetary targeting to in ‡ation targeting is considerably smaller than in the case with endowment shocks.
In a fairly narrow sense, this paper has few antecedents. Almost all the work done in this area employs models with sticky or staggered prices and very few, as Collard Poole (1970) , monetary targeting generates higher welfare for money demand shocks irrespective of the degree of risk aversion, b) for real shocks, interest rate targeting produces higher welfare only when risk aversion is high. Finally, using a deterministic OG model with legal restrictions, Smith (1991 Smith ( , 1994 ) compares the two targeting procedures in terms of their e¢ ciency properties and goes on to isolate a "tension between e¢ ciency and determinacy" of monetary equilibria reminiscent of the nineteenth century quantity theory versus real bills doctrine controversy.
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we outline the baseline model without uncertainty and compute optimal monetary policies. In Section 3, we study the role of endowment uncertainty in shaping the optimal choice of monetary instruments. In Section 4, we do the same with money demand shocks.
2. The environment 2.1. Primitives. We consider an economy consisting of an in…nite sequence of two period lived overlapping generations. Time t is discrete and runs from ftg 1 1 . At each date t, young agents are symmetrically assigned to one of two locations. Each location contains a continuum of young agents with unit mass, and our assumptions will imply that locations are always symmetric. There is a single good that may be consumed or stored. Each two-period-lived agent is endowed with w t > 0 units of this good at date t when young and nothing when old. Let c 2t+1 denote the consumption of the …nal good by a representative old agent born at t: All such agents have preferences representable by the utility function
where u is twice-continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave in its arguments. At points below, we will specialize to u(c) = c 1 1 =(1 ), with > 0, and u(c) = ln c when = 1:
The assets available to the agents are goods, which they may store, and …at currency (money). If > 0 units of the good are placed in storage at any date t 1, then x units are recovered from storage at date t + 1, where x > 1. The quantity of money in circulation at the end of period t 1, per young agent, is denoted M t . Let p t < 1 denote the price level at date t. Let p t+1 pt t;t+1 as the in ‡ation rate between period t and t + 1. Then the gross real rate of return on money acquired at date t denoted by R m;t p t =p t+1 = 2.2. Random relocation. Each period, a fraction t of the young agents is relocated to the other location. An agent that is relocated cannot collect the return on any goods she has stored, or that have been stored on her behalf, since goods cannot be transported across locations. However, if an agent is carrying …at currency when she is relocated, then the currency is relocated with it.
Under the circumstances, there are two strategies a agent can use to transfer income over time. First, it can save on its own, storing some quantity of goods and acquiring some quantity of …at currency. The drawback is that if she is relocated then she must abandon her stored goods, and if not, then it is stuck holding …at currency, a "bad" asset (more below on this). Alternatively, she can deposit her entire endowment in a perfectly competitive bank. The bank pools the goods deposited by all the young agents and uses them to acquire a portfolio of stored goods and …at currency. Banks can transport …at currency across locations. It issues claims to the agents whose nature, timing and size are contingent on their relocation status. If an agent does not get relocated, then she gets a return on her deposit that is funded by the goods the bank has stored. If she gets relocated, then she gets a return on her deposit that takes the form of a …at currency payment funded by the bank's holdings of …at currency. Since banks can pool individual risks, it can be checked that the latter strategy always dominates the former one and we will analyze the economy on this basis.
2.3.
Conduct of monetary policy. We allow the government to conduct monetary policy in one of two possible ways. The …rst, called "monetary targeting", is one where the government changes the nominal stock of …at currency at a …xed non-stochastic gross rate > 0 per period, so that M t = M t 1 for all t. The second, called "in ‡ation rate targeting", is one where the government changes the nominal stock of …at currency in such a way as to keep the long-run gross real rate of return on money …xed at 1= : If the net money growth rate is positive then the government uses the additional currency it issues to purchase goods, which it gives to current young agents in the form of lump-sum transfers. If the net money growth rate is negative, then the government collects lump-sum taxes from the current young agents, which it uses to retire some of the currency. The tax (+) or transfer ( ) is denoted t . The budget constraint of the government is
for all t 1.
The bank' s problem.
The asset holdings of young agents are costlessly intermediated by perfectly competitive banks. These banks hold portfolios of …at currency and physical assets, which consist of stored goods. Every young agent deposits her aftertax/transfer income in the bank. The banks divide their deposits between stored goods s t and real balances of …at currency m t , so that
De…ne t mt wt+ t as the ratio of cash reserves to deposits. Banks announce a return of d m t to each mover (one who gets relocated) and d n t to each non-mover (one who stays on in the location she was born). These returns satisfy some constraints. First, relocated agents, of whom there are t ; have to be given money and so the bank has to use its holdings of cash reserves to pay them. Consequently,
must hold, since money earns a return of R m;t = pt p t+1 between t and t + 1 which the bank takes as given. Similarly, the promised return to the non-movers must satisfy
In what follows, we assume that money is a "bad" asset, or that x > R m;t for all t > 1: (2.5) Competition among banks for depositors will, in equilibrium, force banks to choose return schedules and portfolio allocations so as to maximize the expected utility of a representative depositor, subject to the constraints we have described. If w t = w and t = 8t 1, these are known and …xed (as in the standard random relocation model analyzed by Schreft and Smith (1997)), the bank's problem can be rewritten as
Rm;t = x t;t+1 as the gross nominal interest rate between t and t + 1:Note that I t represents the opportunity cost of cash relative to storage. It is then easily checked that the solution to this problem for u(c) = c 1 1 =(1 ) is
Once the optimal is computed using (2.7), the promised returns to movers and non-movers can easily be computed using (2.3)-(2.4). Several points deserve mention here. First, for CRRA utility, notice that the optimal does not depend on w: Second, monetary policy in ‡uences the optimal in the case of CRRA utility only insofar as it determines the relative return on money, I t . Thirdly, for all I > 1, R i¤ Q 1. In words, when the consumption of movers and non-movers are complements (substitutes) a lower return on money requires that the share of current income allocated to movers be relatively high (low). Finally, as has been shown by Schreft and Smith (1997), 0 (I) R 0; 8I i¤ Q 1. An increase in I has both income and substitution e¤ects. First, it decreases the combined income available for consumption next period. However, for any …xed share , it a¤ects movers relatively more. Thus, when the consumptions of movers and non-movers are complements, movers'share must be increased. On the other hand, when the two consumptions are substitutes, it is better to shift consumption from movers to non-movers; hence, should be lowered. As an aside, also note that in this setting, nominal interest rate targeting and in ‡ation rate targeting are exactly identical goals.
2.5. Welfare. Finally, steady state welfare for CRRA utility can be de…ned as
Under monetary targeting, the gross money growth rate is set to . Then in a steady state, R m = 1= and so
holds; since (w + ) = m; we have
Then the problem of choosing the optimal ("steady state welfare maximizing") money growth rate under monetary targeting reduces to
Under in ‡ation rate targeting, the return to money is set to 1= ; i.e., R m;t = 1= 8t: As such, monetary targeting and in ‡ation targeting are exactly identical goals as is evident from (2.8). We close this section with a fairly well-known result about optimal monetary policy in this environment, the proof of which may be found in Bhattacharya, Haslag, and Russell (2005).
Proposition 1. Under in ‡ation rate targeting or equivalently under monetary targeting, the optimal policy is to hold the money stock …xed (zero in ‡ation) if there are no shocks to endowments or liquidity preference.
Notice that this result holds irrespective of the degree of risk-aversion. The intuition for this result is as follows. A planner unconstrained by limited communication would face a rate of return of x since a unit of the good invested in the storage technology this period yields x next period. Such a planner who is deciding to allocate w between the movers and the non-movers would choose an allocation (c m ; c n ) so as to set
The government's objective, of course, is to choose a that maximizes stationary welfare in a decentralized equilibrium. In such a equilibrium involving money, As R m = 1 , using (2.3), (2.4), and the assumed CRRA form of u; it is easily checked that
Thus the government can select an e¢ cient allocation only by setting = 1: As Bhattacharya, Haslag, and Russell (2005) argue, in a OG model, in steady states, every unit of goods devoted to holding money is an unit that is not devoted to acquiring storage; as such, the social opportunity cost of money is the return on storage. Optimality requires that the private opportunity cost of holding money be the same as the social opportunity cost of money. Of course, the private opportunity cost of money is the nominal interest rate, I = x : Hence, = 1 is the best choice. 4 4 As Bhattacharya, Haslag, and Russell (2005) argue, in a in…nitely-lived agent model, the social opportunity cost of providing money is zero (not x) so it is optimal for the private opportunity cost of holding money to be zero -the "Friedman rule". This explains why the Friedman rule = 1=x is not the best choice for the government.
In the next section, we show that the presence of real shocks can alter the very nature of Proposition 1. To foreshadow, in ‡ation rate targeting will deviate from monetary targeting even for logarithmic utility and the prescription for optimal policy will become sensitive to agents'risk aversion.
Endowment uncertainty
We now analyze an economy that is identical to the one studied above, except that the endowment w is now assumed to be stochastic. In particular, we assume that w is drawn each period from a i.i.d distribution f (w) with support [w; w] : Since w is an endowment, we are clearly restricted to choosing distributions whose support lies on < + : Also, for competitive equilibria to exist, w has to stay bounded.
Shocks to the endowment represent real shocks. Our goal is to investigate how monetary policy should respond to such intrinsic real uncertainty. Recall that at the point at which the bank solves its problem, the current endowment is known. But the realization of next period's endowment has not happened yet. The bank cares about next period's endowment because the latter will potentially in ‡uence next period's money demand, hence the next period's price level and thus the return on money between this period and the next. In short, the bank's announcement of d m t will depend on the following period's endowment. In this sense, the bank cannot promise a …xed real return to the movers anymore. The bank knows the distribution for w and forms expectations on the return on money conditional on f (w); in a rational expectations equilibrium, these expectations are correct. We will focus on stationary versions of such equilibria below.
Logarithmic utility.
We start by focusing on the case of logarithmic utility. We assume a condition equivalent to (2.5), which is given by
where w e is the expected value of w. This condition ensures that it is never optimal to reserve currency for non-movers. The bank's problem is now described by
which simpli…es to
Observe that since it takes the return on money and the size of the transfer as given, the bank's choice of will only consider the second and the third terms of the previous expression. Then, the choice of t is given by money, under log utility, the choice of is separate and is not in ‡uenced by this return. An increase in money's rate of return uncertainty e¤ectively increases its opportunity cost and makes it less desirable. However, whatever the opportunity cost of money be, since the elasticity of substitution between the consumption of movers and non-movers remains unity, banks allocate share to be spent on movers' consumption. This will not be the case in the more general CRRA formulation discussed below. 
Welfare at t is given by
Using (3.1) and (3.2) and t = ; W t in (3.3) reduces to
and …nally to
Since w is drawn from a time-invariant i.i.d. distribution, stationary welfare is given by R W f (w) dw: Thus we have
What is the best from the standpoint of stationary welfare? 5 The one that maximizes the last two terms in (3.5). The exercise yields
The optimal monetary policy is to keep the money supply …xed. It is interesting to note that the optimal prescription for the money growth rate coincides with that in the economy with no real shocks studied in Section 2.5. As (3.4) makes clear, this has to do with the special "additive and separable" nature of log utility. In addition to equating the social opportunity cost of money with its private opportunity cost, the government's choice of should also attempt to reduce endowment and rate-of-return of uncertainty over time. However, given the private sector behavior, a reduction in endowment uncertainty w + = w=[1 1
1 by decreasing below unity increases rate of return w t+1 wt uncertainty. With a unit elasticity of consumption substitution (here it is going to be intertemporal) at = 1, the marginal cost of decreasing in order to reduce endowment uncertainty equals its marginal cost in terms of increased rate of return uncertainty. Hence = 1 turns out to be optimal even on this margin. As we demonstrate below, unlike in the deterministic case, the prescription for optimal monetary policy will be di¤erent from zero in ‡ation under in ‡ation rate targeting.
3.1.2.
In ‡ation rate targeting. Under in ‡ation rate targeting, the government …xes the in ‡ation rate at : It follows that the real return to money is given by
Then using t = and (3.6), in (3.4), we get
Notice that (3.8) represents an AR(1) process for real balances where w t is a stochastic "forcing function". The invariant (long run) distribution will depend on w and . Denote the stationary distribution by (m; f (w) ; ). A necessary condition for its existence is
then m 1 will not depend on m 0 : For future reference note that the above stochastic process for m implies that
Using (3.7), stationary welfare is written as What is the best ? The one that solves
In general, it is not possible to characterize (:) analytically for all distributions f (w); as such, we cannot get a generalized closed form expression for~ : We will report results from several numerical experiments below. It can be argued that the optimal value of in ‡ation rate,~ > 1. First, note that in ‡ation rate targeting completely insures against the rate of return uncertainty. So, if endowments were constant, equating social opportunity cost of money with its private opportunity cost will call for = 1. However, note that the income of a young generation depends not only on the current endowment but also on the transfers that they get as a result of monetary injections. So the volatility of income depends on the volatility of endowment as well as transfers. The combined volatilityy can be decreased by increasing the rate of in ‡ation above unity as can be seen from (3.9) above. Hence,~ > 1.
3.2. CRRA utility. We now generalize the above analysis to CRRA utility
In this case, the bank's problem at date t reduces to
(3.10) It is possible to rewrite (3.10) as
since the bank's choice of t cannot depend on the future realization of w except through the return on money which the bank takes as given. The …rst order conditions to the bank's problem yields
; then it is easily checked that
11a) It is clear from (3.11a) that in general, and unlike in the case of logarithmic utility, the bank's choice of is time-dependent. Note that a mean-preserving spread in R m;t e¤ectively increases the opportunity cost of money I t . Then, as discussed before, 0 (I) R 0; 8I i¤ Q 1; can be alternatively rewritten as 0 2 w R 0; 8I i¤ Q 1; where 2 w is the variance of endowment process.
3.2.1. In ‡ation rate targeting. Under in ‡ation rate targeting, R m;t = 1 for all t > 1:
and it follows from (3.11a) that
which is time-independent. Since t = m t m t 1 ; and m t = ( ) (w t + t ) ; we get, as before (see (3.8)),
As described above, given the stochastic process for w, one can then …nd the unconditional long-run distribution of m; (m; f (w); ). To that end, we continue to require that
Then, stationary welfare under an in ‡ation target is given by
which, using (3.12a) reduces to
Thus far, we have not imposed additional structure on the distribution f (w); however, any analysis of optimal requires us to make additional functional assumptions. A reasonably simple form is the uniform over [w; w]. In this case, the invariant distribution takes the form of a trapezoidal distribution 6 , i.e., Finally, using (3.16)-(3.18), one can reduce (3.15) to
No closed form characterizations of the optimal choice of are possible. We will conduct several numerical experiments below.
Monetary targeting.
Under monetary targeting, the government …xes the money growth rate at : It follows that the real return to money is given by
Stationary welfare in this case is then given by The optimal in ‡ation rate ( ) stays above 1 for the entire range of suggesting that positive in ‡ation can be optimal. Even for log utility, the optimal in ‡ation rate is not zero in ‡ation. The optimal money growth rate calls for in ‡ation for low values ( < 1) of riskaversion, zero in ‡ation for = 1; and de ‡ation for high values of risk-aversion ( > 1) The percentage gain in stationary welfare in switching from in ‡ation targeting to monetary targeting varies from near 5% to about 15% as varies between 0.5 and 2.1. The intuiton behind the result that monetary targeting works better than in ‡ation targeting is the following. Consider the logarithmic utility case. Then, under monetary targeting old agents that carry money consume from the endowment of the current young. If the current endowment is relatively high, banks' real money allocation is also relatively high which occurs through a fall in the price level because money supply is predetermined. Thus, while the old non-movers from last period consume stored goods from the last period, the old movers consume an amount that is proportional to the current endomwment. Thus, there is an intertemporal aggregate consumption smoothing under monetary targeting. Under in ‡ation targeting, on the other hand, the amount of money saved for old varies with the current endowment as the price level is …xed. Thus, each period both movers and non-movers consume out of savings from their own income, and thus there is no intertemporal smoothing of consumption. The intuition behind the result that as the risk aversion increases,~ decreases whilẽ increases is the following. As risk aversion increases, an optimal policy gives more weight to reducing the volatility of current income. A lower decreases income volatility (as can be observed from in the log case: w + = 
Liquidity shocks
We now pursue another variation on the standard random relocation model by introducing liquidity shocks. Speci…cally, we assume that t , the fraction of young agents relocating to the other location, is drawn each period from an i.i.d distribution g( ) with support [ ; ] : As described earlier, shocks to represent money demand or liquidity shocks. We assume that these shocks are realized each period before the bank makes its portfolio decisions. 7 Our goal as before is to investigate how monetary policy should respond to shocks to liquidity preference. Analogous to the setting with endowment uncertainty, the bank cares about next period's liquidity demand because it will potentially in ‡uence next period's price level and thus the return on money between this period and the next. As before, we assume the bank knows the distribution for and forms expectations on the return on money conditional on g( ); in a rational expectations equilibrium, these expectations are correct. We will focus on stationary versions of such equilibria below. As we demonstrate below, the impact of such liquidity shocks is entirely di¤erent from the endowment shocks studied earlier, even though at …rst blush it may seem that they ought to have similar e¤ects (after all, both shocks work through liquidity demand and the return on money). 4.1. Logarithmic utility. We hold w …xed for all t: The bank's problem is now described by
7 Smith (2002) and Antinol…, Huybens, and Keister (2001) consider settings where such shocks are realized after the bank has made its portfolio decisions. In such situations, "banking crises" may arise, i.e., if the realized value of the liquidity shock is "too high", the bank may run out of all its cash reserves and even be forced to prematurely liquidate storage. These issues are the subject matter of a companion paper.
Note that bank's choice of will only consider the second and the third term. It is easy to verify that the optimal choice of t is given by t 1
which reduces to
then it can be checked that stationary welfare is given by
What maximizes stationary welfare? The one that solves
, and is implicitly de…ned by~ Proof. First o¤, it is easy to check that
Set~ = 1 in the rhs of (4.4). Then
Tedious algebra veri…es that the rhs of the above expression reduces to
which is not equal to 1.
Clearly, constant money supply, unlike in the case of real endowment shocks, is no longer optimal. 4.1.2. In ‡ation rate targeting. Under in ‡ation rate targeting, the government …xes the in ‡ation rate at : It follows that the real return to money is given by (3.6) . In this case, using (4.1), indirect utility reduces to As before, the optimal is the one that solves @W =@ = 0:
4.3. Numerical results with money demand shocks. Below we report results from several numerical experiments. We adopt the following parametric speci…cation: x = 1:04; w = 1; and g( ) is i.i.d and uniform with support [0:18; 0:22] : We work with the CRRA form, allowing to vary in some experiments. Our results are as follows: in the case of liquidity shocks, for the entire range of risk-aversion ( going from 0.5 to 2.1), a policy of in ‡ation-rate targeting produces the higher welfare.
The optimal net in ‡ation rate maybe positive or negative. The optimal net money growth rate is always negative; that is while under in ‡ation rate targeting, it may be optimal to pursue an expansionary policy, it is never optimal to do so under money growth targeting. The percentage gain in stationary welfare in switching from monetary targeting to in ‡ation targeting varies from near 0.5% to about 7% as varies between 0.5 and 2.1. The gain is smaller than in the case with endowment shocks.
